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VISUAL EARTH OBSERVATION PERFORMANCE IN THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT
Human Performance Measurement IV - Flight Experiments
CPT John F, Huth, CAPT James D. Whiteley, CW3 John E. Hawker
ABSTRACT
A wide variety of secondary payloads have flown on the Space
Transportation System (STS) since its first flight in the 1980s.
These experiments have typically addressed specific issues unique
to the zero-gravity environment, and use the experience and skills
of the mission and payload specialist crew members to facilitate
data collection and ensure successful completion. This paper
presents the results of the Terra Scout experiment, which flew
aboard STS-44 in November 1991. This unique Earth Observation
experiment, specifically required a career imagery analyst as the
payload specialist (operator) as part of the experimental design.
The primary flight equipment was the Spaceborne Direct-View
Optical System (SpaDVOS), a folded optical path telescope system
designed to mount inside the shuttle on the overhead aft flight
deck windows. Binoculars, and a small telescope, were used as
backup optics. Using his imagery background, coupled with
extensive target and equipment training, the payload specialist
was tasked with documenting: 1) The utility of the equipment, 2)
His ability to acquire and track ground targets, 3) The level of
detail he could discern, 4) The atmospheric conditions, and 5)
Other in-situ elements which contributed to or detracted from his
ability to analyze targets. Special emphasis was placed on the
utility of a manned platform for research and development of
future spaceborne sensors. The results and lessons learned from
Terra Scout will be addressed, including human performance and
equipment design issues.
I. INTRODUCTION.
Since the very beginnings of the space program, various DOD
organizations have shown an on-again, off-again interest in manned
surveillance from a spaceborne platform. Unclassified literature
indicates two of the earliest programs were the Dyna Soar and
Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) programs of the 1950s and 1960s,
respectively [1]. Both of these programs were purportedly
cancelled due to cost overruns and the political climate, before
being tested. From the early 70s, when the Apollo program was
winding down, until the beginning of the Shuttle program in the
80s, the DOD showed little interest in such programs. Whether
this was due to opportunity or other reasons is unclear. Interest
by the services surged in 1985 with the beginning of the Military-
Man-In-Space (MMIS) program. The objective of the MMIS program is
to capitalize on man's unique decision making abilities, and apply
these skills to satisfy DOD objectives.
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Various experiments were proposed by the military services at
the beginning of the MMIS program. Included in the list of
experiment proposals were three military earth observation
experiments; one from each of the services. The three experiments
-- Battleview, Moses, and Terra Scout were proposed by the Air
Force, Navy, and Army, respectively. Terra Scout was unique in
that the experiment required a payload specialist (PS) who was a
military imagery analyst and would use specifically designed
optics, rather than a career astronaut provided with off-the-shelf
optics. The drawbacks to this approach were numerous, the optics
had to be designed and tested, and using a PS meant a greater
shuttle performance margin requirement as well as fighting
numerous political battles. As one might predict, the other two
earth observation experiments were flown prior to Terra Scout.
Battleview, with Army input (known as Terra View), Moses, and
another experiment called Space Debris were combined together as a
Tri-Service experiment call M88-1. These experiments were
conducted on STS-28 in August 1989. It was our opinion, after
reviewing the results from this fllght, that we were on the right
track. The crew had reporting seeing ships, large swept wing
aircraft, and the crew commander said with slightly better optics
he would be able to see trucks on a highway. They also found that
large aperture optics (a 6" Celestron) were useless because of the
poor optical quality of the shuttle windows. This finding was
later supported by optical tests of the space overhead windows by
Armstrong Aeromedlcal Research Laboratory (AAMRL) and the
Aerospace Corporation [2,3].
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP.
The primary optical equipment selected for the Terra Scout
experiment was the Spaceborne-Direct View optical System (SpaDVOS)
(see Fig 1). The SpaDVOS was developed by AAMRL, with enough
funding from the Air Force and Army to build two flight units.
The SpaDVOS was originally designed for human factors experiments
by AAMRL and was first flown on STS-38 in December 1990. Using
the comments from the astronauts who used the SpaDVOS on-orbit, a
number of hardware modifications were made to prepare for the
Terra Scout experiment.
The original purpose of the Terra Scout experiment was to
collect data which could be used to determine the ability of the
PS to collect valuable information in real time. During the seven
year development of the experiment, the objective evolved to
include a variety of R&D issues such as: testing the flexibility
of the man-in-the-loop, estimating how well the Soviet cosmonauts
could see from their manned platforms, identifying potential
utility/benefit of real-time observations to the DOD (e.g., crisis
augmentation), the utility or advantages of 1lye-color analysls,
and the utility of the Shuttle as an R&D platform for future
experimentation.
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The general approach for data collection used by the PS was to
mount the SpaDVOS optics in the overhead, aft flight deck windows
using the window shade clamps. Next the SpaDVOS was connected to
the 28VDC orbiter power and orbiter Video Tape Recorder (VTR)
system then switched on. The PS then initialized the system by
moving the tracking mirror forward/aft and side to side. Target
data was entered for up to three targets. This data included the
Mission Elapsed Time (MET) of closest approach to the target, the
off-nadir angle or direction to the target, and the orbiter
altitude and velocity at that MET. By entering this information
on a keypad, an internal computer provided the operator pointing
cues to the target from one minute prior to acquisition until
visual loss of the site. These cues were displayed by two LED
displays in the eyepiece providing cross-track and along-track
data. When these LED displays were "zeroed-out" the operator was
assured that his target was in the teiescope's field of view.
While target acquisition was strictly manual, once the target site
had been acquired, tracking could be done manually, or in a
semi-automated mode using a joystick to control the along-track
velocity of the tracking mirror. While the target was being
tracked, the operator could zoom in or out and change the aperture
setting (f-stop) with two handles on the bottom side of the
SpaDVOS (see Fig 2). Three eyepieces were provided so the
operator could select the best magnification for the target site.
These covered a magnification range from 4X to 67X. Each of these
eyepieces, as well as other SpaDVOS functions, were tested during
the characterization pass over the first ground site.
The way that the SpaDVOS unit was able to capture light and
record on a video tape is as follows:
The optical path of the SpaDVOS has a beamsplitter just before
the light is reflected into the eyepiece. The beamsplitter
routes half the light to the eyepiece and the other half to a
Charge Coupled Device (CCD). The CCD image was recorded using
the obiter VTR system. Since the CCD image is not magnified
by the eyepiece, the visual and recorded images have different
scales. The purpose of the recording was to visually confirm
the operator was in the target areas, and record his verbal
comments on the audio track. As alternate optics, the PS also
had a pair of 14X70 Fujinon binoculars and a 15-60X Bausch &
Lomb spotting telescope.
The PS was to analyze both pre-planned and ad hoc targets.
Pre-planned targets were selected during mission planning, and the
PS was familiar with these by studying target folders. These
folders were taken aboard for reference and refresher prior to
target acquisition, and to annotate comments about target status
after a target pass. Pre-planned targets included a variety of
military and geographical targets, as well as four large
resolution grid targets (see Fig. 3). The pattern of disks on the
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resolution grid, which are known as Blackwe11 disks, were changed
after each shuttle overflight by teams on the ground. They also
measured the illumination (contrast) and collected weather
measurements at the four resolution sites. Ground truth for the
other sites was provided by national technical means. Ad hoc
targets were targets which were uplinked to the PS during the
mission, and for which no target folders existed.
The PS trained for the experiment by extensive study of target
folders, becoming familiar with the hardware, and by using the
Flexible Image Generation System (FIGS) at AAMRL. The FIGS
simulates what he would see looking at the earth with SpaDVOS at
shuttle altitudes and velocities. Additlonally, he had the
opportunity to use the SpaDVOS during testing on a Lear Jet and
several "Zero-G" (KC-135) flights.
Terra Scout was manifested for flight in June of 1990. The
flight assigned was STS-44, which was scheduled for an early 1991
launch. While things started to pull together during the
preparation for launch, there were several technical and
operational concerns. Window tests on spare overhead windows made
the case for smaller aperture optics, such as SpaDVOS, to be near
optimal. The concern was what the usable magnification would be
even with a near optimal aperture [2,3]. Several improvements
were made to SpaDVOS as a result of STS-38. The eyepiece focus
adjustment was redesigned and additional eyepieces were tested and
added to better cover the magnification range. An along-track
motor drive was added to the SpaDVOS unit, despite the short time
before launch. This allowed smoother tracking than could be done
manually. There were also indications from both the STS-38, as
well as the "Zero-G" flight, that having the PS stable during
target acquisition and tracking could be a problem; a means of
restraining him with a harness and straps from the treadmill was
devised.
A primary human factors concern was if the PS would experience
space sickness and how this would effect his skills to conduct the
experiment. Atmospheric effects were another key concern. Not
only should you count on almost doubling the number of
opportunities you need to account for weather, but the effects of
recent volcanic activity, oil fires, and rain forest burning were
evident in the sunsets. We were curious about the effect this
would have on our data collection. A study done for us by the
Army Research Institute in 1987 estimated we would need 20 good
observation opportunities for statistical significance [4]. Under
the experimental design we were to make comparisons between our
spaceborne observer and a ground-based observer, who was provided
with similar data to analyze. Taking 20 as our minimum sample
size, and with 42 opportunities in our flight plan, we were near
where we needed to be, using the rule of thumb for weather.
However, the other factors were still complete unknowns.
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.
On 15 Nov 91 we conducted our L-5 (5 days prior to launch)
checkout of the experiment hardware, the last check before it was
moved to the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) and then into the
mlddeck lockers. STS-44 launched just after 6:30 p.m. on 24 Nov
91. The next day, on orbit 17, was the first scheduled
observation opportunity. This was a characterization pass on a
resolutlon target. The pass was successful and the resolution
grid and largest clrcles were acquired. However, several minutes
later, on another resolution target pass the cueing system
malfunctioned. It was discovered that by cycling the power, the
anomaly could be corrected. This problem never occurred prior to
flight, and could not be duplicated nor the source discovered
afterward;
The calibration passes, which were done during the early part
of the mission, indicated that the best eyepiece to use was the
21mm at maximum zoom. This provided a magnification of
approximately 30x.
Another anomaly, which occurred was the lack of smoothness in
the tracking. This also had never occurred during ground or
Zero-G testing. Although the Initial thought was that launch
vibrations may have damaged the hardware, a post-mission analysis
of the hardware and discussions with the PS and commander made us
suspicious that the hardware may have been damaged between L-5 and
flight. This possibility was based on the two anomalies
discussed, as well as damage to the eyepieces and the outside of
the SpaDVOS. None of these conditions existed prior to launch,
but were present on-orbit. Damage to eyepieces and on the outside
of a piece of hardware, that are surrounded by foam packing, would
not be expected by normal launch vibration, nor were they
experienced with the hardware on STS-38 or with the M88-1 hardware
on STS-28 or STS-44.
The hardware anomalies, however, did not significantly impact
the mission objectives. Rather, the combination of window quality
and atmosphere had the most adverse effects. The w_ndows limlted
the effective magnification of the 9mm eyepiece, such that it was
not usable in full zoom. However, atmospheric conditions were the
greatest detractor from the experiment. STS-44 was described as
one of the cloudiest missions in shuttle history. Additionally,
the combination of environmental factors, which were responsible
for recent spectacular sunsets, also degraded our observation
capabilities. Satellite data analyzed by the Space Shuttle Earth
Observation Office indicated that the atmosphere over our
resolution sites were well below optimal. Also, the comments
recorded by the PS indicated that the resolution sites were
typically clearer than the other ground targets. Comments by the
veteran astronauts on the flight supported the PS comments and the
satellite data analyzed by NASA.
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On day seven of the mission, a malfunction in the space
shuttle's back-up IMU forced an early termination of the mission.
Not only were there eleven more opportunities planned, but the PS
and MS for the M88-1_experiment who had previously been competing
for window space, managed to find a way of using both experiments
in the window simultaneously. This would have provided more
observation opportunities for both experiments, as well as other
potential synergistic outcomes. In the final tally only eight of
the observation opportunities provided enough data for adequate
analysis.
Our concerns about the stability of the observer in the
eyepiece turned out not to be an issue as the PS had no problem
with stability. Also, concern over the space sickness effects on
the PS satisfactorily resolved itself as the PS experienced no
space sickness. One issue that did arise during the course of the
experiment was the complication involved in communication with the
PS. Trying to resolve anomalies to get experiment status would be
much clearer if the PI were allowed direct communication with the
PS/MS.
With the small sample size, statistlcal analysis was
difficult, at best. Even without statistical significance, we
believe that with the data collected, we have successfully met our
objectives. The abillty of the PS to dynamically acquire targets
other than those which were provided to him in real time, detect
target motion, work around or fix hardware anomalies, and use his
decision making abilitles to streamline the conduct of the
experiment, demonstrated the flexibility and utility of the
man-in-the-loop. These were all worthwhile data points which are
hardto quantify.
The SpaDVOS was very capable of providing target acquisition
and tracking capability. Under certain conditions, the PS
reported seeing the disks down to 24ft., as well as identifying
the 15 foot wide grid lines outlinlng the grids. Note that grid
lines being long, linear features aids in their identification.
His observations also indicated the strong correlation between
resolution and the angle off nadir to the target. Most of the
opportunities did not allow sufficient resolution for analysis
primarily due to atmospheric and window conditions limiting
effective magnification. Based on previous window tests, as well
as the limited number of good observations we did make, it seems
unlikely that good resolution through the windows would be
consistently available to do any analysis further than identifying
surface ships or large aircraft. These conditions combined with
shuttle orbital parameters make tactical target detection
serendipitous at best. This is not to say that further testing of
other available optics should not be done, as the variables which
effect in-cabln resolution and their relative effects are not
sufficiently understood. Hardware with characteristics similar to
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SpaDVOS would be useful for geological and weather applications,
however, the device should have a single optical path. This would
preclude poor video recording caused by optimizing the aperture
for the observer, and leaving insufficient light for recording
images.
While the resolution needed for detailed target analysis was
not sufficient, the level of detail that was available from the
SpaDVOS and the 14X70 binoculars did allow the PS to observe ships
and large aircraft. Observations of this type activity does have
direct impact on operations security. Just as the Soviet's have
conducted extensive testing on color vision, there are strong
indications that their manned orbiting vehicles have been used to
conduct extensive military experiments. These experiments have
most likely included the evaluation of man's ability to identify,
track, and locate targets and R&D of advanced reconnaissance and
surveillance systems [5]. Knowing they have windows in their
space station and given their interest in exploiting their space
capabilities, it is not unreasonable to assume that their windows
are likely of optical quality. This would provide them with an
"in-cabin" resolution capability much better than our current
capability. This should be well considered for our future manned
systems if we plan to test systems for military or environmental
purposes.
The capability of viewing a scene in color seems to be a
significant contributor to target acquisition, tracking, and
analysis. This is based on comments from the PS, which support
the comments of other cosmonauts and astronauts. The phenomena of
color vision and color observation from orbit has been
investigated extensively by the Soviet's [6] and warrants further
analysis. It is the spectral content of a ground scene which we
are planning to exploit in future experiments.
The major advantage in using the current shuttle program for
military earth observation would be to test advanced sensors in
the payload bay. For testing advanced sensors the shuttle
provides:
- A controllable platform at many available altitudes and
attitudes.
- Easily returnable payloads.
- Testing in the space environment.
The advantages of using a PS for specific experiments are
significant when a particular skill is needed. A Principal
Investigator (PI) should always use the most qualified person for
the task. Therefore, he is better and more intensively trained on
experiment specific tasks. He is more available for feedback,
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providing his feedback to the experimenters in a common language,
making it easier to relate his experiences. Additionally, our PS
was completely integrated into the crew, becoming involved with
other experiments as well as Terra Scout. This worked to the
advantage Of everyone. This was particularly true of the medical
experiments, which will further our understanding of physiological
effects of spaceflight on the human body.
It is our conclusion that the experiment was an overall
success and related follow-on experimentation, research and
development should be pursued.
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